FOR THE DISTRICT O	DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND
NORTHERN DIV	ISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)))
v. HILTON THOMAS,)) Criminal Docket No. WMN-97-0355) (EXCERPT: PRONOUNCEMENT OF) SENTENCE)
Defendant	
	Baltimore, Maryland June 1, 2016 10:16 AM to 4:41 PM
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATE	
RE-SENTENCI BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILL	
APPEARAI	N C E S
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On behalf of the Government:	
Robert Harding, Assis	tant U.S. Attorney
On behalf of the Defendant:	
	ger, Asst. Federal Public Defender tant Federal Public Defender
<u> </u>	mechanical stenography,
Proceedings recorded by transcript produced by compu	2 ± ± ·
<u> </u>	ter. RPR, RMR, CRR URT REPORTER

EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF JUNE 1, 2016

THE COURT: All right. There has been some loose discussion with respect to a departure from the guidelines.

I'm going to simply bypass the issue of a departure at this point. I think it will be clear in a moment that it wouldn't affect the ultimate disposition in this matter.

It seems to me that the primary sentencing factors that are being focused on are § 3553(a)(1), which there are really two factors within that: nature and circumstances of the offense, and Mr. Thomas' history and his personal characteristics.

It seems as though the Defense's primary focus is on Mr. Thomas' history and his characteristics, and the Government's on the nature and circumstances of the offense. And there is certainly considerable merit from my perspective to the Government's emphasis on the horrendous nature of the criminal acts underlying these charges; in particular, the murder of John Jones in the presence of young children, the impact on numerous victims, and the five others certainly cannot be overlooked.

But, as to whether Mr. Thomas' crimes evidenced transient immaturity, a term frankly relatively new to me, it does appear that the Defense has produced considerable evidence to show that Mr. Thomas' characteristics were replete with youthful immaturity and developmental dysfunction and

warrants some consideration.

Ms. Reid and Dr. James' testimony are both, I find, probative of the Defendant's history and character regarding youthful dysfunction at the times of the crimes in question, and it's very clear that Mr. Thomas had a terribly abusive and neglected childhood. Ms. Reid's testimony, if I recall it correctly, was that his history shows one of the worst situations that she'd ever seen.

My own observations -- Ms. Newberger alluded to this in her argument, indicated back in 1999 gross immaturity on Mr. Thomas' part in failing or being unable to recognize his exposure to a life sentence, coupled I think with a childlike pride in following his hero, Jerry Williams, to trial and being unable to comprehend the inevitable conclusion of a conviction and a heavy penalty. It's simply a clear inability to comprehend the risk and, to me, a mark of transient immaturity.

I think there is considerable merit in Dr. James' testimony as well as Ms. Reid's testimony that Mr. Thomas has undergone some change for the positive, and what they testified to supports the conclusions that Ms. Newberger reached in her memorandum that the last eight years have shown some substantial changes in Mr. Thomas' maturity and his ability to recognize responsibility, and the mere fact of his transfer to a minimum-security prison and some positive

reports from a chaplain there seem to confirm that.

The Government's apparent claim that Mr. Thomas is as dangerous today as he was in 1999 seems to me to be factually flawed. I think Mr. Thomas' egregious acts back then were performed primarily as a role player in my understanding, and I think there is some merit to Mr. Harding's argument that he, in some respects, was something of a leader, but it seems to me the inescapable fact is that his activities were essentially carried out within the organization of the drug-dealing business, and the likelihood of him returning to that milieu is, to me, extremely unlikely.

I do agree with much of the Government's assessment of Mr. Thomas' character in regard to his not having been remorseful or truly accepting of his antisocial and criminal tendencies, but there does appear to be this significant change over the last eight years.

In regard to the protection of the public,
Mr. Thomas' acts, as horrendous as they were, simply were not
perpetrated on the general public. His behavior, as I
indicated, was all within this milieu of a warring drug or
drug organizations, and, as I said, very unlikely that his
return would put him back into any kind of situation like
that.

It seems the basic question is whether Mr. Thomas' responsibility for his criminal conduct is mitigated because

of his adolescence and some related impairment of his cognitive functioning, and my conclusion with respect to that, based on all the evidence that I have heard and bearing on the sentencing factors, is that Mr. Thomas, by virtue of his adolescence and his particularly serious cognitive impairment, which I think was due both to his immaturity by age but was exacerbated by the staggeringly dysfunctional upbringing by parents that were so grossly incompetent it's beyond comprehension, and the terrible atmosphere in which he had to function in a drug-infested neighborhood, I think all of that warrants consideration in an appropriate sentence.

If Mr. Thomas had been 14 or 15, I would conclude that his impairment due to immaturity and cognitive ability or disability might warrant the 30 years that is now being advanced by the Defense as the appropriate sentence. At age 17, it's a different situation, and I think there is a lot of merit in Mr. Harding's argument with regard to the proportionality concern, so that a sentence of 30 years given those things would be a concern to me, as well as a basic concern that I have with this entire concept where the Supreme Court seems to be drawing a bright line between sentencing somebody who is maybe 17 and a half and somebody who is 18. But I am convinced, contrary to Mr. Harding's argument, that Mr. Thomas was more of a follower than a leader, all things considered.

1 The bottom line of all of this is that, in my view, 2 the appropriate sentence in this matter is a sentence of 480 months, 40 years, as to Count 2, and a like sentence as to 3 Count 4, running concurrently with the sentence in Count 2 and 4 with the original sentences in Counts 1 and 3, and the same 5 term of supervised release that was ordered in 1999, and the 6 7 same conditions. 8 Mr. Thomas, as before, you have a right of appeal in regard to this matter, and I'm sure Ms. Newberger will counsel 9 10 you with respect to that, but, if you take an appeal, it's 11 going to have to be entered within ten days' time. 12 Harkening back for a second as to the departure in 13 this matter, I can only say, if a departure were granted, the 14 result would be the same. 15 So, counsel, if there are any questions or anything 16 you want to add to the record, I'll be glad to hear from you. 17 MR. HARDING: No, thank you, Your Honor. 18 **THE COURT:** Ms. Newberger? 19 MS. NEWBERGER: Your Honor, for -- if Your Honor was 20 willing to do so, for clarity, in the line where it imposes 21 the sentence, if, in addition to the statement regarding 22 Count 2 and Count 4 running concurrently, if it can also --23 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Say it again. 24 MS. NEWBERGER: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

If it could indicate that -- and I think that this

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would be implicit, but this is an unusual circumstance of a resentencing this late. If it could state that with credit for time served since October 15th of 1997, which was the date that he was taken into custody as reflected in the presentence report.

THE COURT: Well, it's not up to me to make the determination as to what the appropriate credit is. That sounds like it's correct to me, but it's ultimately up to the Bureau of Prisons to make that determination.

All right. Thank you, counsel. Good job.

THE CLERK: All rise. This Honorable Court stands in recess.

(Recess.)

THE COURT: Counsel, as I think we're all aware at the moment, I misspoke with regard to the sentence as to Count 4, because it has a statutory maximum of 20 years, and so the sentence as to Count 4 should be noted as a sentence of 20 years.

MS. NEWBERGER: Your Honor, Ms. Swillo pointed out that the statutory maximum period of supervised release on Count 4 is three years and not five years, so, although it will run concurrent with the five-year supervised release term on Count 2, it does technically need to be three years of supervised release on Count 4.

THE COURT: All right. Supervised release will be

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1	noted as did you say three years is the maximum
2	MS. NEWBERGER: Three years, yes.
3	THE COURT: for Count 4?
4	PROBATION OFFICER: Yes, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: All right. Three years, running
6	concurrently to Count 2, and the same conditions.
7	Anything else for the record?
8	MR. HARDING: No, thank you, Your Honor.
9	MS. NEWBERGER: No, thank you, Your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
11	THE CLERK: All rise.
12	(Recess.)
13	
14	I, Martin J. Giordano, RMR, CRR, Official Court
15	Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and
16	accurate transcript from the stenographic record of
17	proceedings in the above-captioned matter, as reported by
18	Jacqueline Sovich, Official Court Reporter.
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20	
21	Dated this 30th day of April 2017.
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23	Martin J. Giordano
24	MARTIN J. GIORDANO, RMR, CRR
25	FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER